Perhaps what is most instructive about this view of biopolitics and resistance is that life-resistance is not exclusive to *human* agencies and actions, especially when considered from the perspective of networks as living networks. Life-resistance puts forth the difficult, sometimes frustrating proposition that "life" is not always synonymous with the limited cause-and-effect relations usually attributed to human agencies; in this sense, networks—or living networks—contain an anonymity, a nonhuman component, which consistently questions common notions of action, causality, and control.

The Exploit

In the non-protocological arenas, progressive political change is generated through struggle, through the active transfer of power from one party to another. For example, the institution of the forty-hour workweek was the result of a specific shift in power from capital to labor. To take another example, women's liberation is the result of specific transfers of power in the areas of law (suffrage, abortion, birth control), in the expectations surrounding domestic labor, biological and social ideas about gender, and so on.

Yet within protocological networks, political acts generally happen not by shifting power from one place to another but by exploiting power differentials already existing in the system.

This is due mainly to the fundamentally informatic nature of networks. Informatic networks are largely immaterial. But immaterial does not mean vacillating or inconsistent. They operate through the brutal limitations of abstract logic (if/then, true or false).

Protocological struggles do not center around changing existent technologies but instead involve discovering holes in existent technologies and projecting potential change through those holes.[59] *Hackers call these holes "exploits."*

Thinking in these terms is the difference between thinking socially and thinking *informatically*, or the difference between thinking

in terms of probability and thinking in terms of *possibility*. Informatic spaces do not bow to political pressure or influence, as social spaces do. But informatic spaces do have bugs and holes, a by-product of high levels of technical complexity, which make them as vulnerable to penetration and change as would a social actor at the hands of more traditional political agitation.

Let us reiterate that we are referring only to *protocological* resistance and in no way whatsoever suggest that non-protocological practice should abandon successful techniques for effecting change such as organizing, striking, speaking out, or demonstrating. What we suggest here is a supplement to existing practice, not a replacement for it.

The goal for political resistance in life networks, then, should be the discovery of exploits—or rather, the reverse heuristic is better: look for traces of exploits, and you will find political practices.

Let's flesh out this idea using examples from actual practice, from specific scenarios. The first is an instance of the protocological masquerading as biological: the computer virus. Deleuze mentions computer viruses in his 1990 interview with Negri:

> It's true that, even before control societies are fully in place, forms of delinquency or resistance (two different things) are also appearing. Computer piracy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and what the nineteenth century called "sabotage" ("clogging" the machinery).[60]

Computer viruses have a spotted history; they often involve innovative programming techniques that have been used in other areas of computer science, but they are also often tagged as being part of delinquent or criminal activities. Should computer viruses be included in the "history" of computers? How much have viruses and antivirus programs contributed to the development of "official" computer science and programming? The majority of the early instances of computer viruses have ties to either the university or the corporation: the "Darwin" game (AT&T/Bell Labs, early 1960s), "Cookie Monster" (MIT, mid-1960s), "Creeper" and "Reaper" (BBN, early 1970s), "tapeworm" (XeroxPARC, early 1970s), and so on.[61] Like early hacking activities, their intent was mostly exploratory. Unlike hacking, how-

fects are almost impossible to predict, network causality is not necessarily the same as network accountability. Especially in cases where networks involve multiple interactions between human subjects or groups, the question of "ethical protocols" comes to the forefront.

In addition, it is in the nature of networks to transgress boundaries of all kinds—institutional, disciplinary, national, technical, and biological. As illustrated previously, a single entity such as a computer worm or pouch of powdered anthrax immediately draws together a range of network nodes (computers, companies, people, software; bodies, hospitals, people, drugs). Network borders exist in a range of ways, including information borders (secure servers), biological borders (inter- and cross-species infection), architectural borders (public spaces, airports, urban environments), and political borders (state and national boundaries). Not only will action need to be reconsidered within networks, but action will need to be reconsidered across networks. If a network contains its own failure, then it also contains its own transgressions of borders.

It is possible to distill these claims into something of a formal description. The following is a definition of the exploit as an abstract machine.

- *Vector:* The exploit requires an organic or inorganic medium in which there exists some form of action or motion.
- *Flaw:* The exploit requires a set of vulnerabilities in a network that allow the vector to be logically accessible. These vulnerabilities are also the network's conditions for realization, its becoming-unhuman.
- *Transgression:* The exploit creates a shift in the ontology of the network, in which the "failure" of the network is in fact a change in its topology (for example, from centralized to distributed).

Counterprotocol

We have derived a few points, then, for instigating political change in and among networks. These might be thought of as a series of challenges for "counterprotocological practice," designed for anyone wishing to instigate progressive change inside biotechnical networks.

First, oppositional practices will have to focus not on a static map of one-to-one relationships but on a dynamic diagram of many-to-many relationships. The diagram must not be anthropomorphic (the gesture, the strike); it must be unhuman (the swarm, the flood).

This is a nearly insurmountable task. These practices will have to attend to many-to-many relationships without making the dangerous mistake of thinking that many-to-many means total or universal. There will be no universals for life. This means that *the counterprotocols of current networks will be pliant and vigorous* where existing protocols are flexible and robust. We're tired of being flexible. Being pliant means something else, something vital and positive. Or perhaps "superpliant" would be a better term, following Deleuze's use of the word in the appendix to his book on Foucault.[67] Counterprotocols will attend to the tensions and contradictions within such systems, such as the contradiction between rigid control implicit in network protocols and the liberal ideologies that underpin them. Counterprotocological practice will not avoid downtime. It will restart often.

The second point is about tactics. In reality, counterprotocological practice is not "counter" anything. Saying that politics is an act of "resistance" was never true, except for the most literal interpretation of conservatism. We must search-and-replace all occurrences of "resistance" with "impulsion" or perhaps "thrust." Thus the concept of resistance in politics should be superseded by the concept of hypertrophy.

Resistance is a Clausewitzian mentality. The strategy of maneuvers instead shows that the best way to beat an enemy is to become a better enemy. One must push through to the other side rather than drag one's heels. There are two directions for political change: resistance implies a desire for stasis or retrograde motion, but hypertrophy is the desire for pushing beyond. The goal is not to destroy technology in some neo-Luddite delusion but to push technology into a hypertrophic state, further than it is meant to go. "There is only one way left to escape the alienation of present-day society: *to retreat ahead of it*," wrote Roland Barthes.[68] We must scale up, not unplug. Then, during the passage of technology into this injured, engorged, and un-

guarded condition, it will be sculpted anew into something better, something in closer agreement with the real wants and desires of its users.

The third point has to do with structure. Because networks are (technically) predicated on creating possible communications between nodes, oppositional practices will have to focus less on the characteristics of the nodes and more on the quality of the interactions between nodes.

In this sense, the distinction between node and edge will break down. Nodes will be constructed as a by-product of the creation of edges, and edges will be a precondition for the inclusion of nodes in the network. Conveyances are key. From the oppositional perspective, nodes are nothing but dilated or relaxed edges, while edges are constricted, hyperkinetic nodes. Nodes may be composed of clustering edges, while edges may be extended nodes.

Using various protocols as their operational standards, networks tend to combine large masses of different elements under a single umbrella. The fourth point we offer, then, deals with motion: counterprotocol practices can capitalize on the homogeneity found in networks to resonate far and wide with little effort.

Again, the point is not to do away with standards or the process of standardization altogether, for there is no imaginary zone of nonstandardization, no zero place where there is a ghostly, pure flow of only edges. Protocological control works through inherent tensions, and as such, counterprotocol practices can be understood as tactical implementations and intensifications of protocological control.

On a reflective note, we must also acknowledge that networks, protocols, and control are not only our objects of study; they also affect the means and methods by which we perform analysis and critique. Events such as computer viruses or emerging infectious diseases require a means of understanding that draws together a number of disciplines, modes of analysis, and practices. This challenge bears as much on cultural theory and the humanities as it does on computer science, molecular biology, and political theory.

If, as the truism goes, it takes networks to fight networks, then it also takes networks to understand networks, as well.

This is the first step in realizing an ethics and a politics of networks, an activation of a political consciousness that is as capable of the critiquing of protocological control as it is capable of fostering the transformative elements of protocol. What would a network form of praxis be like? Just as network protocols operate not through static relationships, and not by fixed nodes, so must any counterprotocol practice similarly function by new codings, whether in terms of disciplines, methodologies, or practices.[69] In a discussion of intellectuals and power, Deleuze provides a helpful way of further thinking about counterprotocol practices:

> The relationship which holds in the application of a theory is never one of resemblance. Moreover, from the moment a theory moves into its proper domain, it begins to encounter obstacles, walls, and blockages which require its relay by another type of discourse. . . . Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall.[70]

Because a network is as much a technical system as it is a political one, any theory addressing networks will have to entertain a willingness to theorize at the technical level.

This not only means a radical interdisciplinarity but also means a willingness to carry theorization, and its mode of experimentation, to the level of protocological practices.

Today to write theory means to write code. There is a powerful exhilaration in the transformation of real material life that guides the writing of counterprotocological code. As Geert Lovink reminds us: "No more vapor theory anymore."[71]

We may speculate, then, that as the instruments of social transformation follow this call to action, the transition from the present day into the future might look something like this:

	Societies of Control . . .	*. . . the Future*
control diagram	cybernetics; protocol	physics; particle swarms
machine	computers	bioinformatics
resistive act	mutation; subversion	desertion; perturbation
delinquent act	randomness	nonexistence
political algorithm	disturbance	hypertrophy
stratagem	security; exception	gaming; inception
historical actor	communities; the people	élan vital; multitude
mode of liberation	neoliberal capitalism	"life-in-common"

muted into quality," wrote Benjamin.[33] Labor is always measured in time, in numbers. But from this numerical form, labor, comes the real, reified qualitative form of the commodity. A social relation becomes an object—this is the meaning of reification.

But when all is information, the forging of objects is no longer most important. Instead, sources, essences, recipes, and instruction sets are madly sought after and protected. The source fetishists are the new exploitative classes, what McKenzie Wark calls the "vectoralists." This is as much of a problem in genomics as it is in computer science. The practice of bioprospecting, whereby rare or unique genes are harvested from the planet's biodiversity hot spots for their value as pure information, has little by little committed entire species to digital form, ignoring and often discarding their actual lived reality.

For generations the impoverished classes have been defined as *those who have nothing but their bodies to sell*. This used to mean, simply, selling one's human labor power. Given sufficient sustenance, the impoverished classes could always manage to do this, producing at work and reproducing at home—the two requirements of workers. The dire reality of having nothing but one's body to sell has not changed. But today the impoverished classes are being exploited informatically as well as corporally. To survive, they are expected to give up not just their body's labor power but also their body's *information* in everything from biometric examinations at work, to the culling of consumer buying habits, to prospecting inside ethnic groups for disease-resistant genes. The biomass, not social relations, is today's site of exploitation.

Tactics of Nonexistence

The question of nonexistence is this: how does one develop techniques and technologies to make oneself unaccounted for? A simple laser pointer can blind a surveillance camera when the beam is aimed directly at the camera's lens. With this type of cloaking, one is not hiding, simply nonexistent to that node. The subject has full presence but is simply not there *on the screen*. It is an exploit. Elsewhere, one might go online but trick the server into recording a routine event. That's nonexistence. One's data is there, but it keeps moving, of its own accord, in its own temporary autonomous ecology. This is

"disingenuous" data, or data in camouflage as not-yet-data. Tactics of abandonment are positive technologies; they are tactics of fullness. There is still struggle in abandonment, but it is not the struggle of confrontation, or the bureaucratic logic of war. It is a mode of nonexistence: the full assertion of the abandonment of representation. Absence, lack, invisibility, and nonbeing have nothing to do with nonexistence. Nonexistence is nonexistence not because it is an absence, or because it is not visible, but precisely because it is full. Or rather, because it permeates. That which permeates is not arbitrary, and not totalizing, but tactical.

Of course, nonexistence has been the concern of antiphilosophy philosophers for some time. Nonexistence is also a mode of escape, an "otherwise than being." Levinas remarks that "escape is the need to get out of oneself."[34] One must always choose either being or nonbeing (or worse, becoming . . .). The choice tends to moralize presence, that one must be accounted for, that one must, more importantly, account for oneself, that accounting is tantamount to self-identification, to *being* a subject, to individuation. "It is this category of getting out, assimilable neither to renovation nor to creation, that we must grasp. . . . It is an inimitable theme that invites us to get out of being."[35] And again Levinas: "The experience that reveals to us the presence of being as such, the pure existence of being, is an experience of its powerlessness, the source of all need."[36]

Future avant-garde practices will be those of nonexistence. But still you ask: how is it possible not to exist? When existence becomes a measurable science of control, then nonexistence must become a tactic for any thing wishing to avoid control. "A being radically devoid of any representable identity," Agamben wrote, "would be absolutely irrelevant to the State."[37] Thus we should become devoid of any *representable* identity. Anything measurable might be fatal. These strategies could consist of nonexistent action (nondoing); unmeasurable or not-yet-measurable human traits; or the promotion of measurable data of negligible importance. Allowing to be measured now and again for false behaviors, thereby attracting incongruent and ineffective control responses, can't hurt. A driven exodus or a pointless desertion are equally virtuous in the quest for nonexistence. The bland, the negligible, the featureless are its only evident traits. The nonexistent is that

which cannot be cast into any available data types. The nonexistent is that which cannot be parsed by any available algorithms. This is not nihilism; it is the purest form of love.

Disappearance; or, I've Seen It All Before

For Paul Virilio, disappearance is the unforeseen by-product of speed. Technology has gone beyond defining reality in the quantized frames-per-second of the cinema. Newer technologies still do that, but they also transpose and create quantized data through time stretching, morphing, detailed surface rendering, and motion capture, all with a level of resolution beyond the capacity of the human eye (a good argument for optical upgrades): "The world keeps on coming at us, to the detriment of the object, which is itself now assimilated to the sending of information."[38] Things and events are captured before they are finished, in a way, before they exist as things or events. "Like the war weapon launched at full speed at the visual target it's supposed to wipe out, the aim of cinema will be to provoke an effect of vertigo in the voyeur-traveler, the end being sought now is to give him the impression of being projected into the image."[39] Before the first missiles are launched, the battlefield is analyzed, the speeches are made, the reporters are embedded, the populations migrate (or are strategically rendered as statistical assets), and the prime-time cameras are always on. But this is not new, for many of Virilio's examples come from World War II military technologies of visualization. In this context, a person is hardly substantial—one's very physical and biological self keeps on slipping away beneath masses of files, photos, video, and a panoply of Net tracking data. But luckily you can move. All the time, if you really want to.

Hakim Bey's "temporary autonomous zone" (TAZ) is, in a way, the response to Virilio's warnings against the aesthetics of disappearance. But the issue here is nomadism, not speed. Or for Bey, nomadism is the response to speed (especially the speed produced by the war + cinema equation). A TAZ is by necessity ephemeral: gather, set up, act, disassemble, move on. Its ephemeral nature serves to frustrate the recuperative machinations of capital. The TAZ nomad is gone before the cultural and political mainstream knows what happened. This

raises the issue of efficacy. The TAZ wages the risk of an efficacy that is invisible, de-presented, an efficacy whose traces are more important than the event itself. (Is this a distributed efficacy?) But this then puts us into a kind of cat-and-mouse game of forever evading, escaping, fleeing the ominous shadow of representation. Perhaps the challenge today is not that of hypervisualization (as Virilio worries), or of non-recuperation (as Bey suggests), but instead a challenge of existence without representation (or at least existence that abandons representation, a nonexistence, an a-existence). "Disappearance is not necessarily a 'catastrophe'—except in the mathematical sense of 'a sudden topological change.'"[40] And so goes the juvenile interjection of apathy, only now reimagined as distinctly tactical and clever: whatever.

Stop Motion

First call to mind the stories of H. P. Lovecraft, or perhaps Elias Merhinge's film *Begotten*. A person comes across a lump of gray, dirty clay. Just sitting there. No, it is starting to move, all by itself. It makes squishy sounds as it does so. When it's finished it has formed itself into the face of the person, and the person is suddenly Dr. Faustus. Or take another scenario: a person comes across a strange, part-insect, part-amphibian thing lying there. Is it alive? How can one be sure? Poke it, carefully nudge it, maybe even touch it. Or the grainy, dirty body lying in the mud can't stop convulsing, and yet it is dead. The traditions of supernatural horror and "weird fiction" are replete with scenarios like these, populated by "unnameable horrors," a "thing on the doorstep," unidentified "whisperers in darkness," and a "ceaseless, half-mental calling from the underground."[41]

The question of animation and the question of "life" are often the same question. Aristotle's *De anima* identified motion and animation as one of the principal features of living beings: "Now since being alive is spoken of in many ways . . . we may say that the thing is alive, if, for instance, there is intellect or perception or spatial movement and rest or indeed movement connected with nourishment and growth and decay."[42] If it moves, it is alive. But the mere fact of movement isn't enough. The Aristotelian notion of substance implies that there must be some principle of self-movement beyond the mere matter of

50. This results in the historical development of a "political science" or a political economy, through which the coordination of resources, peoples, and technologies can be achieved. As Foucault states: "The constitution of political economy depended upon the emergence from among all the various elements of wealth of a new subject: population. The new science called political economy arises out of the perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth; and this is accompanied by the formation of a type of intervention characteristic of government, namely intervention in the field of economy and population. In other words, the transition which takes place in the eighteenth century from an art of government to a political science, from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to one ruled by techniques of government, turns on the theme of population and hence also on the birth of political economy." Foucault, "Governmentality" in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 100–101.

51. This multistep process is simply a heuristic. To be precise, these steps do *not* happen consecutively. They take place in varying orders at varying times, or sometimes all at once. For example, certain foundational protocols must always precede the genesis of a network (making our step three come before step two). Then after the network is in place, new protocols will emerge.

52. Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 182. The difficulty with relying on Deleuze, however, is that he came to the topic of resisting informatic control rather late in his work (as did Foucault). His work on the topic often includes question marks and hesitations, as if he were still formulating his opinion.

53. Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 210.

54. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 92.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., translation modified. The quoted phrases refer to Foucault's *History of Sexuality*.

57. In addition, the recurring tropes of AI and "intelligence" (both artificial intelligence and governmental/military intelligence) are made to bolster the dream of a transcendent mind that is not the brain, and a brain that is not the body.

58. D. N. Rodowick, "Memory of Resistance," in *A Deleuzian Century?* ed. Ian Buchanan (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 44–45.

59. Political movements oriented around changing existing technologies certainly do exist. We wish not to diminish the importance of such struggles but simply to point out that they are not protocological struggles (even if they are struggles over protocological technologies) and therefore inappropriate to address in the current discussion.

60. Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 175.

61. For a popular overview and discussion of computer viruses, see Stephen Levy, *Artificial Life* (New York: Vintage, 1992), 309.

62. See Fred Cohen, "Computer Viruses: Theory and Experiments," *Computers and Security* 6 (1987): 22–35. Also see Cohen's much-referenced study of computer viruses, *A Short Course on Computer Viruses* (Pittsburgh: ASP Press, 1990).

63. The Web sites of antivirus software makers such as Norton Utilities contain up-to-date statistics on currently operational computer viruses.

64. On computer viruses as a-life, see Eugene Spafford, "Computer Viruses as Artificial Life," in *Artificial Life: An Overview*, ed. Christopher Langton (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).

65. These and other SARS figures are contained in the Web sites for the WHO and the CDC. For a recent Rand report on emerging infectious diseases, see Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, *The Global Threat of New and Reemerging Infectious Diseases* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003).

66. See Eugene Thacker, "Biohorror/Biotech," *Paradoxa* 17 (2002); and "The Anxieties of Biopolitics," *Infopeace.org* (Information, Technology, War, and Peace Project) (Winter 2001), http://www.watsoninstitute.org.

67. "It would be neither the fold nor the unfold . . . but something like the *Superfold* [*Surpli*], as borne out by the foldings proper to the chains of the genetic code, and the potential of silicon in third-generation machines. . . . The forces within man enter into a relation with forces from the outside, those of silicon which supersedes carbon, or genetic components which supersede the organism, or agrammaticalities which supersede the signifier. In each case we must study the operations of the superfold, of which the 'double helix' is the best known example." Deleuze, *Foucault*, 131–32.

68. Roland Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), 40.

69. Deleuze goes on to describe how Foucault's work with power reached a certain wall, a limit concerning the silence on the part of those subjected by disciplinary systems such as prisons. This led Foucault to form the GIP (Prisoner's Information Group), opening a new discourse between prisoners, activists, and intellectuals, which decisively informed his work in *Discipline and Punish*. But the same can be said of Deleuze, or anyone doing cultural, social, and political work; one identifies a certain limit point, beyond which something must change. That something could just as easily be concepts as it could be methodology. Or it could be the discarding of a previous set of practices altogether. Further, it could also be a lateral jump from one discipline to another, from a discipline based on theory to one based on practice. Whatever the case, the limit point Deleuze describes is implicit in theoretical work, and this is our responsibility here in addressing protocological control.

70. Deleuze, "Intellectuals and Power," 205–6.

71. Geert Lovink, *Dark Fiber* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), 9.

22. On December 1, 2003—World AIDS Day—Health and Human Services officials directly linked diseases and war. Just as troops in Iraq were "saving people from tyranny," so were U.S. health agencies "saving people from disease."

23. The CDC has had a number of network-based programs under way that address this network-response challenge. The Enhanced Surveillance Project and the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System are two examples.

24. Beniger, *The Control Revolution*, 20.

25. Critical Art Ensemble, *The Electronic Disturbance* (New York: Autonomedia, 1994), 12.

26. Julian Stallabrass, "Just Gaming: Allegory and Economy in Computer Games," *New Left Review* 198 (March–April 1993): 104.

27. Vilém Flusser, *Writings* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 20.

28. Geert Lovink, *My First Recession* (Rotterdam: V2, 2003), 14.

29. Ibid., 47.

30. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. Martin Milligan (New York: Prometheus, 1988), 75–76. Marx also speaks of the instruments of labor in a way that recalls his earlier formulation of the "inorganic body," in effect placing the inorganic body of the 1844 manuscripts within the context of capitalism: "Leaving out of consideration such ready-made means of subsistence as fruits, in gathering which a man's bodily organs alone serve as the instruments of his labor, the object the worker directly takes possession of is not the object of labour but its instrument. Thus nature becomes one of the organs of his activity, which he annexes to his own bodily organs." Karl Marx, *Capital, Volume I*, trans. Ben Fowkes (1867; New York: Penguin, 1990), 285.

31. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), 659.

32. Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic* (New York: Vintage, 1973), 153.

33. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 239.

34. Emmanuel Levinas, *On Escape* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 55.

35. Ibid., 54.

36. Ibid., 67.

37. Agamben, *The Coming Community*, 86.

38. Paul Virilio, *The Aesthetics of Disappearance* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), 101.

39. Ibid., 58.

40. Hakim Bey, *TAZ: The Temporary Autonomous Zone* (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991), 132.

41. The "extradimensional biological" stories of Lovecraft, Clark Ashton Smith, and Frank Belknap Long stand out in this subgenre. The other

references in this paragraph are to *Faust* (dir. Jan Svankmajer, 1994); *The Thing* (dir. John Carpenter, 1982); H. P. Lovecraft, "The Dunwich Horror" and "The Call of Cthulhu," in *The Call of Cthulhu and Other Weird Stories* (New York: Penguin, 1999); and *Begotten* (dir. Elias Merhinge, 1990).

42. Aristotle, *De anima*, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (New York: Penguin, 1986), 2.2, p. 159.

43. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1.22.2, in *Selected Writings*, ed. and trans. Ralph McInerny (New York: Penguin, 1998).

44. Henri Bergson, "The Perception of Change," in *The Creative Mind* (New York: Citadel, 1974), 147.

45. Raoul Vaneigem, *A Declaration of the Rights of Human Beings* (London: Pluto, 2004), 31–32.

46. Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 77.

47. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 411.

48. Luis Villareal, "Are Viruses Alive?" *Scientific American*, December 2004, 105.

49. Roland Barthes, *Image–Music–Text* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 149.

50. See Georges Bataille, *The Accursed Share*, vol. 1 (New York: Zone, 1998).

Coda

1. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 222.

2. Ibid., 99.

3. In this characterization, Hobbes would represent the side of secular sovereignty (in fact, sovereignty is a precondition for the commonwealth to exist at all), whereas Spinoza would represent the side of the multitude (following on his ontology, which emphasizes radical immanence, "God or nature," as the basic principle of all reality). But this is, of course, only a heuristic opposition. Hobbes, for all his railing against the "multitude not yet united into one person," shows a great deal of ambivalence about the role that the multitude plays (this is especially evident in *De cive*). Sometimes it is the threat of instability within the commonwealth (the "disease" of civil war), and sometimes the multitude is necessary for the passage from the "state of nature" to a fully formed commonwealth. Likewise, while contemporary readings of Spinoza often radicalize him as a proponent of the multitude, texts such as the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* show an equally ambivalent attitude toward the multitude: sometimes it is a revolutionary, almost self-organizing force, and at other times it is simply factionalism and mob rule.

4. Paolo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude*, trans. Isabella Bertoletti (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 25.

5. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)," in *Networks and Netwars* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), 6.